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Abstract
This piece has been reprinted from TomDispatch.com and is an adapted and expanded version of the
introduction to Alfred W. McCoy's new book: In the Shadows of the American Century: The Rise and
Decline of U.S. Global Power (Haymarket Books, 2017). Thanks to TomDispatch.com, Dr. McCoy and
Haymarket Books for allowing us to reprint this here.
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In the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks, Washington pursued its elusive enemies across
the landscapes of Asia and Africa, thanks in part to a massive expansion of its intelligence
infrastructure, particularly of the emerging technologies for digital surveillance, agile drones, and
biometric identification. In 2010, almost a decade into this secret war with its voracious appetite
for information, the Washington Post reported that the national security state had swelled into a
“fourth branch” of the federal government -- with 854,000 vetted officials, 263 security
organizations, and over 3,000 intelligence units, issuing 50,000 special reports every year.
Though stunning, these statistics only skimmed the visible surface of what had become history’s
largest and most lethal clandestine apparatus. According to classified documents that Edward
Snowden leaked in 2013, the nation’s 16 intelligence agencies alone had 107,035 employees and
a combined “black budget” of $52.6 billion, the equivalent of 10% percent of the vast defense
budget.
By sweeping the skies and probing the worldwide web’s undersea cables, the National
Security Agency (NSA) could surgically penetrate the confidential communications of just about
any leader on the planet, while simultaneously sweeping up billions of ordinary messages. For its
classified missions, the CIA had access to the Pentagon’s Special Operations Command, with
69,000 elite troops (Rangers, SEALs, Air Commandos) and their agile arsenal. In addition to this
formidable paramilitary capacity, the CIA operated 30 Predator and Reaper drones responsible
for more than 3,000 deaths in Pakistan and Yemen.
While Americans practiced a collective form of duck and cover as the Department of
Homeland Security’s colored alerts pulsed nervously from yellow to red, few paused to ask the
hard question: Was all this security really directed solely at enemies beyond our borders? After
half a century of domestic security abuses -- from the “red scare” of the 1920s through the FBI’s
illegal harassment of antiwar protesters in the 1960s and 1970s -- could we really be confident
that there wasn’t a hidden cost to all these secret measures right here at home? Maybe, just
maybe, all this security wasn’t really so benign when it came to us.
From my own personal experience over the past half-century, and my family’s history
over three generations, I’ve found out in the most personal way possible that there’s a real cost to
entrusting our civil liberties to the discretion of secret agencies. Let me share just a few of my
own “war” stories to explain how I’ve been forced to keep learning and relearning this
uncomfortable lesson the hard way.
On the Heroin Trail
After finishing college in the late 1960s, I decided to pursue a Ph.D. in Japanese history
and was pleasantly surprised when Yale Graduate School admitted me with a full fellowship. But
the Ivy League in those days was no ivory tower. During my first year at Yale, the Justice
Department indicted Black Panther leader Bobby Seale for a local murder and the May Day
protests that filled the New Haven green also shut the campus for a week. Almost
simultaneously, President Nixon ordered the invasion of Cambodia and student protests closed
hundreds of campuses across America for the rest of the semester.
In the midst of all this tumult, the focus of my studies shifted from Japan to Southeast
Asia, and from the past to the war in Vietnam. Yes, that war. So what did I do about the draft?
During my first semester at Yale, on December 1, 1969, to be precise, the Selective Service cut
up the calendar for a lottery. The first 100 birthdays picked were certain to be drafted, but any
dates above 200 were likely exempt. My birthday, June 8th, was the very last date drawn, not

number 365 but 366 (don’t forget leap year) -- the only lottery I have ever won, except for a
Sunbeam electric frying pan in a high school raffle. Through a convoluted moral calculus typical
of the 1960s, I decided that my draft exemption, although acquired by sheer luck, demanded that
I devote myself, above all else, to thinking about, writing about, and working to end the Vietnam
War.
During those campus protests over Cambodia in the spring of 1970, our small group of
graduate students in Southeast Asian history at Yale realized that the U.S. strategic predicament
in Indochina would soon require an invasion of Laos to cut the flow of enemy supplies into
South Vietnam. So, while protests over Cambodia swept campuses nationwide, we were huddled
inside the library, preparing for the next invasion by editing a book of essays on Laos for the
publisher Harper & Row. A few months after that book appeared, one of the company’s junior
editors, Elizabeth Jakab, intrigued by an account we had included about that country’s opium
crop, telephoned from New York to ask if I could research and write a “quickie” paperback
about the history behind the heroin epidemic then infecting the U.S. Army in Vietnam.
I promptly started the research at my student carrel in the Gothic tower that is Yale’s
Sterling Library, tracking old colonial reports about the Southeast Asian opium trade that ended
suddenly in the 1950s, just as the story got interesting. So, quite tentatively at first, I stepped
outside the library to do a few interviews and soon found myself following an investigative trail
that circled the globe. First, I traveled across America for meetings with retired CIA operatives.
Then I crossed the Pacific to Hong Kong to study drug syndicates, courtesy of that colony’s
police drug squad. Next, I went south to Saigon, then the capital of South Vietnam, to investigate
the heroin traffic that was targeting the GIs, and on into the mountains of Laos to observe CIA
alliances with opium warlords and the hill-tribe militias that grew the opium poppy. Finally, I
flew from Singapore to Paris for interviews with retired French intelligence officers about their
opium trafficking during the first Indochina War of the 1950s.
The drug traffic that supplied heroin for the U.S. troops fighting in South Vietnam was
not, I discovered, exclusively the work of criminals. Once the opium left tribal poppy fields in
Laos, the traffic required official complicity at every level. The helicopters of Air America, the
airline the CIA then ran, carried raw opium out of the villages of its hill-tribe allies. The
commander of the Royal Lao Army, a close American collaborator, operated the world’s largest
heroin lab and was so oblivious to the implications of the traffic that he opened his opium
ledgers for my inspection. Several of Saigon’s top generals were complicit in the drug’s
distribution to U.S. soldiers. By 1971, this web of collusion ensured that heroin, according to a
later White House survey of a thousand veterans, would be “commonly used” by 34% of
American troops in South Vietnam.
None of this had been covered in my college history seminars. I had no models for
researching an uncharted netherworld of crime and covert operations. After stepping off the
plane in Saigon, body slammed by the tropical heat, I found myself in a sprawling foreign city of
four million, lost in a swarm of snarling motorcycles and a maze of nameless streets, without
contacts or a clue about how to probe these secrets. Every day on the heroin trail confronted me
with new challenges -- where to look, what to look for, and, above all, how to ask hard questions.
Reading all that history had, however, taught me something I didn’t know I knew. Instead of
confronting my sources with questions about sensitive current events, I started with the French
colonial past when the opium trade was still legal, gradually uncovering the underlying,
unchanging logistics of drug production. As I followed this historical trail into the present, when
the traffic became illegal and dangerously controversial, I began to use pieces from this past to

assemble the present puzzle, until the names of contemporary dealers fell into place. In short, I
had crafted a historical method that would prove, over the next 40 years of my career,
surprisingly useful in analyzing a diverse array of foreign policy controversies -- CIA alliances
with drug lords, the agency’s propagation of psychological torture, and our spreading state
surveillance.
The CIA Makes Its Entrance in My Life
Those months on the road, meeting gangsters and warlords in isolated places, offered
only one bit of real danger. While hiking in the mountains of Laos, interviewing Hmong farmers
about their opium shipments on CIA helicopters, I was descending a steep slope when a burst of
bullets ripped the ground at my feet. I had walked into an ambush by agency mercenaries.
While the five Hmong militia escorts whom the local village headman had prudently provided
laid down a covering fire, my Australian photographer John Everingham and I flattened
ourselves in the elephant grass and crawled through the mud to safety. Without those armed
escorts, my research would have been at an end and so would I. After that ambush failed, a CIA
paramilitary officer summoned me to a mountaintop meeting where he threatened to murder my
Lao interpreter unless I ended my research. After winning assurances from the U.S. embassy that
my interpreter would not be harmed, I decided to ignore that warning and keep going.
Six months and 30,000 miles later, I returned to New Haven. My investigation of CIA
alliances with drug lords had taught me more than I could have imagined about the covert
aspects of U.S. global power. Settling into my attic apartment for an academic year of writing, I
was confident that I knew more than enough for a book on this unconventional topic. But my
education, it turned out, was just beginning.
Within weeks, a massive, middle-aged guy in a suit interrupted my scholarly
isolation. He appeared at my front door and identified himself as Tom Tripodi, senior agent for
the Bureau of Narcotics, which later became the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). His
agency, he confessed during a second visit, was worried about my writing and he had been sent
to investigate. He needed something to tell his superiors. Tom was a guy you could trust. So I
showed him a few draft pages of my book. He disappeared into the living room for a while and
came back saying, “Pretty good stuff. You got your ducks in a row.” But there were some things,
he added, that weren’t quite right, some things he could help me fix.
Tom was my first reader. Later, I would hand him whole chapters and he would sit in a
rocking chair, shirt sleeves rolled up, revolver in his shoulder holster, sipping coffee, scribbling
corrections in the margins, and telling fabulous stories -- like the time Jersey Mafia boss
“Bayonne Joe” Zicarelli tried to buy a thousand rifles from a local gun store to overthrow Fidel
Castro. Or when some CIA covert warrior came home for a vacation and had to be escorted
everywhere so he didn’t kill somebody in a supermarket aisle.
Best of all, there was the one about how the Bureau of Narcotics caught French
intelligence protecting the Corsican syndicates smuggling heroin into New York City. Some of
his stories, usually unacknowledged, would appear in my book, The Politics of Heroin in
Southeast Asia. These conversations with an undercover operative, who had trained Cuban exiles
for the CIA in Florida and later investigated Mafia heroin syndicates for the DEA in Sicily, were
akin to an advanced seminar, a master class in covert operations.
In the summer of 1972, with the book at press, I went to Washington to testify before
Congress. As I was making the rounds of congressional offices on Capitol Hill, my editor rang

unexpectedly and summoned me to New York for a meeting with the president and vice
president of Harper & Row, my book’s publisher. Ushered into a plush suite of offices
overlooking the spires of St. Patrick’s Cathedral, I listened to those executives tell me that Cord
Meyer, Jr., the CIA’s deputy director for covert operations, had called on their company’s
president emeritus, Cass Canfield, Sr. The visit was no accident, for Canfield, according to an
authoritative history, “enjoyed prolific links to the world of intelligence, both as a former
psychological warfare officer and as a close personal friend of Allen Dulles,” the ex-head of the
CIA. Meyer denounced my book as a threat to national security. He asked Canfield, also an old
friend, to quietly suppress it.
I was in serious trouble. Not only was Meyer a senior CIA official but he also had
impeccable social connections and covert assets in every corner of American intellectual life.
After graduating from Yale in 1942, he served with the marines in the Pacific, writing eloquent
war dispatches published in the Atlantic Monthly. He later worked with the U.S. delegation
drafting the U.N. charter. Personally recruited by spymaster Allen Dulles, Meyer joined the CIA
in 1951 and was soon running its International Organizations Division, which, in the words of
that same history, “constituted the greatest single concentration of covert political and
propaganda activities of the by now octopus-like CIA,” including “Operation Mockingbird” that
planted disinformation in major U.S. newspapers meant to aid agency operations. Informed
sources told me that the CIA still had assets inside every major New York publisher and it
already had every page of my manuscript.
As the child of a wealthy New York family, Cord Meyer moved in elite social circles,
meeting and marrying Mary Pinchot, the niece of Gifford Pinchot, founder of the U.S. Forestry
Service and a former governor of Pennsylvania. Pinchot was a breathtaking beauty who later
became President Kennedy’s mistress, making dozens of secret visits to the White House. When
she was found shot dead along the banks of a canal in Washington in 1964, the head of CIA
counterintelligence, James Jesus Angleton, another Yale alumnus, broke into her home in an
unsuccessful attempt to secure her diary. Mary’s sister Toni and her husband, Washington Post
editor Ben Bradlee, later found the diary and gave it to Angleton for destruction by the agency.
To this day, her unsolved murder remains a subject of mystery and controversy.
Cord Meyer was also in the Social Register of New York’s fine families along with my
publisher, Cass Canfield, which added a dash of social cachet to the pressure to suppress my
book. By the time he walked into Harper & Row’s office in that summer of 1972, two decades of
CIA service had changed Meyer (according to that same authoritative history) from a liberal
idealist into “a relentless, implacable advocate for his own ideas,” driven by “a paranoiac distrust
of everyone who didn’t agree with him” and a manner that was “histrionic and even bellicose.”
An unpublished 26-year-old graduate student versus the master of CIA media manipulation. It
was hardly a fair fight. I began to fear my book would never appear.
To his credit, Canfield refused Meyer’s request to suppress the book. But he did allow the
agency a chance to review the manuscript prior to publication. Instead of waiting quietly for the
CIA’s critique, I contacted Seymour Hersh, then an investigative reporter for the New York
Times. The same day the CIA courier arrived from Langley to collect my manuscript, Hersh
swept through Harper & Row’s offices like a tropical storm, pelting hapless executives with
incessant, unsettling questions. The next day, his exposé of the CIA’s attempt at censorship
appeared on the paper’s front page. Other national media organizations followed his lead. Faced
with a barrage of negative coverage, the CIA gave Harper & Row a critique full of unconvincing
denials. The book was published unaltered.

My Life as an Open Book for the Agency
I had learned another important lesson: the Constitution’s protection of press freedom
could check even the world’s most powerful espionage agency. Cord Meyer reportedly learned
the same lesson. According to his obituary in the Washington Post, “It was assumed that Mr.
Meyer would eventually advance” to head CIA covert operations, “but the public disclosure
about the book deal... apparently dampened his prospects.” He was instead exiled to London and
eased into early retirement.
Meyer and his colleagues were not, however, used to losing. Defeated in the public arena,
the CIA retreated to the shadows and retaliated by tugging at every thread in the threadbare life
of a graduate student. Over the next few months, federal officials from the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare turned up at Yale to investigate my graduate fellowship. The Internal
Revenue Service audited my poverty-level income. The FBI tapped my New Haven telephone
(something I learned years later from a class-action lawsuit).
In August 1972, at the height of the controversy over the book, FBI agents told the
bureau’s director that they had “conducted [an] investigation concerning McCoy,” searching the
files they had compiled on me for the past two years and interviewing numerous “sources whose
identities are concealed [who] have furnished reliable information in the past” -- thereby
producing an 11-page report detailing my birth, education, and campus antiwar activities.
A college classmate I hadn’t seen in four years, who served in military intelligence, magically
appeared at my side in the book section of the Yale Co-op, seemingly eager to resume our
relationship. The same week that a laudatory review of my book appeared on the front page of
the New York Times Book Review, an extraordinary achievement for any historian, Yale’s
History Department placed me on academic probation. Unless I could somehow do a year’s
worth of overdue work in a single semester, I faced dismissal.
In those days, the ties between the CIA and Yale were wide and deep. The campus
residential colleges screened students, including future CIA Director Porter Goss, for possible
careers in espionage. Alumni like Cord Meyer and James Angleton held senior slots at the
agency. Had I not had a faculty adviser visiting from Germany, the distinguished scholar
Bernhard Dahm who was a stranger to this covert nexus, that probation would likely have
become expulsion, ending my academic career and destroying my credibility.
During those difficult days, New York Congressman Ogden Reid, a ranking member of
the House Foreign Relations Committee, telephoned to say that he was sending staff
investigators to Laos to look into the opium situation. Amid this controversy, a CIA helicopter
landed near the village where I had escaped that ambush and flew the Hmong headman who had
helped my research to an agency airstrip. There, a CIA interrogator made it clear that he had
better deny what he had said to me about the opium. Fearing, as he later told my photographer,
that “they will send a helicopter to arrest me, or... soldiers to shoot me,” the Hmong headman did
just that.
At a personal level, I was discovering just how deep the country’s intelligence agencies
could reach, even in a democracy, leaving no part of my life untouched: my publisher, my
university, my sources, my taxes, my phone, and even my friends.
Although I had won the first battle of this war with a media blitz, the CIA was winning
the longer bureaucratic struggle. By silencing my sources and denying any culpability, its
officials convinced Congress that it was innocent of any direct complicity in the Indochina drug

trade. During Senate hearings into CIA assassinations by the famed Church Committee three
years later, Congress accepted the agency’s assurance that none of its operatives had been
directly involved in heroin trafficking (an allegation I had never actually made). The committee’s
report did confirm the core of my critique, however, finding that “the CIA is particularly
vulnerable to criticism” over indigenous assets in Laos “of considerable importance to the
Agency,” including “people who either were known to be, or were suspected of being, involved
in narcotics trafficking.” But the senators did not press the CIA for any resolution or reform of
what its own inspector general had called the “particular dilemma” posed by those alliances with
drug lords -- the key aspect, in my view, of its complicity in the traffic.
During the mid-1970s, as the flow of drugs into the United States slowed and the number
of addicts declined, the heroin problem receded into the inner cities and the media moved on to
new sensations. Unfortunately, Congress had forfeited an opportunity to check the CIA and
correct its way of waging covert wars. In less than 10 years, the problem of the CIA’s tactical
alliances with drug traffickers to support its far-flung covert wars was back with a vengeance.
During the 1980s, as the crack-cocaine epidemic swept America’s cities, the agency, as its own
Inspector General later reported, allied itself with the largest drug smuggler in the Caribbean,
using his port facilities to ship arms to the Contra guerrillas fighting in Nicaragua and protecting
him from any prosecution for five years. Simultaneously on the other side of the planet in
Afghanistan, mujahedeen guerrillas imposed an opium tax on farmers to fund their fight against
the Soviet occupation and, with the CIA’s tacit consent, operated heroin labs along the Pakistani
border to supply international markets. By the mid-1980s, Afghanistan’s opium harvest had
grown 10-fold and was providing 60% of the heroin for America’s addicts and as much as 90%
in New York City.
Almost by accident, I had launched my academic career by doing something a bit
different. Embedded within that study of drug trafficking was an analytical approach that would
take me, almost unwittingly, on a lifelong exploration of U.S. global hegemony in its many
manifestations, including diplomatic alliances, CIA interventions, developing military
technology, recourse to torture, and global surveillance. Step by step, topic by topic, decade after
decade, I would slowly accumulate sufficient understanding of the parts to try to assemble the
whole. In writing my new book, In the Shadows of the American Century: The Rise and Decline
of U.S. Global Power, I drew on this research to assess the overall character of U.S. global power
and the forces that might contribute to its perpetuation or decline.
In the process, I slowly came to see a striking continuity and coherence in Washington’s
century-long rise to global dominion. CIA torture techniques emerged at the start of the Cold
War in the 1950s; much of its futuristic robotic aerospace technology had its first trial in the
Vietnam War of the 1960s; and, above all, Washington’s reliance on surveillance first appeared
in the colonial Philippines around 1900 and soon became an essential though essentially illegal
tool for the FBI’s repression of domestic dissent that continued through the 1970s.
Surveillance Today
In the wake of the 9/11 terror attacks, I dusted off that historical method, and used it to
explore the origins and character of domestic surveillance inside the United States.
After occupying the Philippines in 1898, the U.S. Army, facing a difficult pacification campaign
in a restive land, discovered the power of systematic surveillance to crush the resistance of the
country’s political elite. Then, during World War I, the Army’s “father of military intelligence,”

the dour General Ralph Van Deman, who had learned his trade in the Philippines, drew upon his
years pacifying those islands to mobilize a legion of 1,700 soldiers and 350,000 citizenvigilantes for an intense surveillance program against suspected enemy spies among GermanAmericans, including my own grandfather. In studying Military Intelligence files at the National
Archives, I found “suspicious” letters purloined from my grandfather’s army locker. In fact, his
mother had been writing him in her native German about such subversive subjects as knitting
him socks for guard duty.
In the 1950s, Hoover’s FBI agents tapped thousands of phones without warrants and kept
suspected subversives under close surveillance, including my mother’s cousin Gerard Piel, an
anti-nuclear activist and the publisher of Scientific American magazine. During the Vietnam
War, the bureau expanded its activities with an amazing array of spiteful, often illegal, intrigues
in a bid to cripple the antiwar movement with pervasive surveillance of the sort seen in my own
FBI file.
Memory of the FBI’s illegal surveillance programs was largely washed away after the
Vietnam War thanks to Congressional reforms that required judicial warrants for all government
wiretaps. The terror attacks of September 2001, however, gave the National Security Agency the
leeway to launch renewed surveillance on a previously unimaginable scale. Writing for
TomDispatch in 2009, I observed that coercive methods first tested in the Middle East were
being repatriated and might lay the groundwork for “a domestic surveillance
state.” Sophisticated biometric and cyber techniques forged in the war zones of Afghanistan and
Iraq had made a “digital surveillance state a reality” and so were fundamentally changing the
character of American democracy.
Four years later, Edward Snowden’s leak of secret NSA documents revealed that, after a
century-long gestation period, a U.S. digital surveillance state had finally arrived. In the age of
the Internet, the NSA could monitor tens of millions of private lives worldwide, including
American ones, via a few hundred computerized probes into the global grid of fiber-optic cables.
And then, as if to remind me in the most personal way possible of our new reality, four years
ago, I found myself the target yet again of an IRS audit, of TSA body searches at national
airports, and -- as I discovered when the line went dead -- a tap on my office telephone at the
University of Wisconsin-Madison. Why? Maybe it was my current writing on sensitive topics
like CIA torture and NSA surveillance, or maybe my name popped up from some old database of
suspected subversives left over from the 1970s. Whatever the explanation, it was a reasonable
reminder that, if my own family’s experience across three generations is in any way
representative, state surveillance has been an integral part of American political life far longer
than we might imagine.
At the cost of personal privacy, Washington’s worldwide web of surveillance has now
become a weapon of exceptional power in a bid to extend U.S. global hegemony deeper into the
twenty-first century. Yet it’s worth remembering that sooner or later what we do overseas always
seems to come home to haunt us, just as the CIA and crew have haunted me this last halfcentury. When we learn to love Big Brother, the world becomes a more, not less, dangerous
place.

